#### AGREEMENT ON KUTCH

#### AGREEMENT DATED 30TH JUNE, 1965

#### BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

WHEREAS both the Government of India and Pakistan have agreed to a ceasefire and to restoration of the status quo as at 1 January 1965, in the area of Gujarat/West Pakistan border, in the confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo/Pakistan border;

WHEREAS it is necessary that after the status quo has been established in the aforesaid Gujarat/West Pakistan border area, arrangements should be made for determination and demarcation of the border in that area;

NOW therefore, the two Governments agree that the following action shall be taken in regard to the said area;

#### Article 1

There shall be an immediate cease-fire with effect from 0030 hrs GMT 1 July 1965.

#### Articel 2.

# On the cease-fire:

- (i) All troops on both sides will immediately begin to withdraw;
- (ii) This process will be completed within
  seven days;
- (iii) Indian police may then re-occupy the post at Chhad Bet in strength no greater than that employed at the post on 31 December 1964;
- (iv) Indian and Pakistan police may patrol on the tracks on which they were patrolling prior to 1 January 1965, provided that their patrolling will not exceed in intensity that which they were doing prior to 1 January 1965 and during the monsoon period will not exceed in intensity that done during the monsoon period of 1964;
- (v) If patrols of Indian and Pakistan police should come into contact they will not interfere with

each other, and in particular will act in accordance with West Pakistan/India border ground rules agreed to in January 1960:

(vi) Officials of the two Governments will meet immediately after the cease-fire and from time to time thereafter as may prove desirable in order to consider whether any problems arise in the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs (iii) and (v) above and to agree on the settlement of any problem.

#### Article 3.

- (i) In view of the fact that:
- (A) India claims that there is no territorial dispute as there is a well established boundary running roughly along the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch as shown in the pre-partition maps, which needs to be demarcated on the ground;
- (B) Pakistan claims that the border between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch runs roughly along the 24th Parallel as is clear from several pre-partition and post-partition documents and therefore the dispute involves some 3,500 square miles of territory;
- (C) At discussions in January 1960, it was agreed by Ministers of the two Governments that they would each collect further data, regarding the Kutch-Sind boundary and that further discussions would be held later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute;
- (D) As soon as officials have finished the task referred to in Article 2 (vi), which in any case will not be later than one month after the cease-fire, Ministers of the two Governments will meet in order to agree on the determination of the border in the light of their respective claims, and the arrangements for its demarcation. At this meeting and at any proceeding before the tribunal referred to in Article 3(ii) and (iv) below, each Government will be free to present and develop their case in full.
- (ii) In the event of no agreement between the Ministers of the two Governments on the determination of the border being reached within two months of the cease-fire, the two Governments shall, as contemplated in the joint communique of 24th October, 1959, have recourse to the Tribunal referred to in (iii) below for determination of the border in the light of their respective claims and evidence produced before it and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on both parties.

(iii) For this purpose there will be constituted, within four months of the cease-fire, a Tribunal consisting of three persons, none of whom would be a national of either India or Pakistan. One member shall be nominated by each Government and the third member, who will be the Chairman shall be jointly selected by the two Governments. In the event of the two Government failing to agree on the selection of the Chairman within three months of the cease-fire they shall request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to nominate the Chairman.

(iv) The decision of the Tribunal referred to in (iii) above shall be binding on both Governments, and shall not be questioned on any ground whatsoever. Both Governments undertake to implement the findings of the Tribunal in full as quickly as possible and shall refer to the Tribunal for decision any difficulties which may arise between them in the implementation of these findings. For that purpose the Tribunal shall remain in being until its findings have been implemented in full.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Agreement.

Done in duplicate at New Delhi this thirtieth day of June 1965 in the English language.

For the Government of India.

For the Government of Pakistan.

#### APPENDIX II

# PROCLAMATION OF WAR OF LIBERATION

The Revolutionary Council of Kashmir proclaims:

Brave Kashmiris,

ARISE, for now is the time.

We have suffered long enough under the oppressive and trecherous rule of imposters and enemy agents.

Long enough have we allowed the traitors to further the enemy designs.

REMEMBER that a Hindu despot who ruled over us, in utter disregard of the wishes of the people, sold us to India in 1947. This was the second sale of our land through a fraudulent and ignoble deed which brought the might of the cursed Indian Army into our beautiful and peaceful land.

BETRAYED though we were we fought the enemy on every inch of our sacred soil. And we should have won but for the intervention of the United Nations who obtained an undertaking from India that we will exercise our inalienable right of self-determination under a free and fair plebiscite.

The United Nations was duped and so was the whole world. India dishonoured her international pledge shamelessly and with utter contempt for world opinion.

She played for time to occupy our land. Since then every day that has passed has been a day of misery and every night a night of crime. You know that acts of cruelty, sacrilege and barbarity the enemy has been perpetrating under the shadow of guns and bayonets.

For years our great leaders Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg have been languishing in Indian prisons but their determination to throw off the yoke of Indian imperialism remains unflagging.

We have seen our children butchered but every drop of their blood has illuminated the path of our struggle.

Our women were dishonoured but in their agony they sanctified the course of our freedom.

Our brave fighters lost their lives but their dying-calls stirred the hearts of their compatriots.

The will of our people remains unbroken; their united might unshaken.

The enemy is on the run. We will not rest content till we have chased him out of our land.

The time has come for us to deliver the final blow and hereby we take a solemn pledge to take up arms once again and continue the fight till -

- (a) the usurpers are expelled out of our land;
- (b) our leaders now in jail are freed; and
- (c) the will of the people is allowed to determine the future of our land.

The Revolutionary Council which consists of patriots of unimpeachable integrity and men of unswerving faith, has set up today the National Government of the people of Jammu and Kashmir which decrees as here-under:

# From Today -

- (a) all alleged treaties and agreements between the imperialist Government of India and Kashmir stand annulled and are no longer binding on us;
- (b) the National Government of Jammu and Kashmir formed by the Revolutionary Council of Kashmir is the sole lawful authority in our land;
- (c) only the National Government will be legally competent to receive taxes and public dues from the people of the state;
- (d) any Kashmiri national who willfully cooperates with the Indian Government or their puppet administration in occupied Kashmir will be treated as traitor and dealt with as such;
- (e) every national of the state of Jammu and Kashmir who may be employed either by the Imperialist Indian Government or its puppet administration, in civil or military capacity, shall support the freedom movement of the Revolutionary Council in every possible way;

- (f) the National Government will issue orders and decrees on the Kashmir National Radio representing the "Voice of Kashmir";
- (g) any national of Kashmir who impedes the freedom movement or disobeys any order or decree of the National Government will be dealt with as a traitor.

The Revolutionary Council appeals to the world to support this freedom movement.

Now is the time for countries who have pledged themselves to help all freedom movements against imperialism to come to our assistance.

We have nothing against the people of India but their Government have established a record of treachery and dishonesty in the world. We expect all sane and freedom-loving elements in India and particularly the brave Sikhs, the South Indians and the Rajputs who have always given us moral support to lend us active assistance.

The people of Pakistan have stood by us in our fight. To our regret they have not done as much as we expected of them. Now is the time for them too to join us in our struggle for life and liberty.

Let the nations of the world remember that if we go down the light of freedom will be extinguished for ever.

And above all, you the people of Kashmir, you are the ones who are on trial. You are the ones who must win this war for the sake of coming generations, for the sake of freedom and for the sake of the glory of your motherland.

Arise: Now or there will be no tomorrow:

Issued by the Revolutionary Council of Kashmir. Sadi Kashmir Press, Srinagar.

APPENDIX - III (CAPTURED OP ORDER OF PAK ARMY) TOP SEC

Copy No.3 (No change from VOs) HQ 4 ARMD BDE G 3548 08 Sep 65

. 2

00 No.1

1 in to 0.789 miles Sheets 44 I 7, 8,11,12,15 Maps:and 16 44 M 3 and 4. SIT 1

# а.

En Forces. A bde gp sp by tks each in KHEM KARAN 8256 and BEDIAN 7576 area.

#### Friendly Forces Ъ.

- 3 Armd Bde gp moving astride KASUR (1) Branch to secure JANDIALA GURU.
- 12 CAV will move ahead of 3 Bde on Div (2) CL. 5 Armd Bde after having secured br H at KASUR 7153 in 11 Div op, will revert to

parant fmn and will, move on axis WEST

of KASUR Branch. Atts and Dets c. ACT

# (1) Under Comd

MSN

Rd.

Two ADS ex 48 Fd Amb Lt Wksp pl 72 EME Bn Det Pro 15 (SP) Fd Regt (2) In DS

#### Div Arty when in range (3) In Sp

4 Armd Bde gp will adv on axis KASUR - KHEM KARAN - VALTOHA 9064 - X rds 0872

- NABIPUR 1868 - astride SOBRAON BRANCH on orders and secure BEAS br on main GT

#### 3 XEC

- The op will be Gen Out-line in three a. phases:-
  - (1) Phase 1 Move into br H area.
  - Phase 2 Secure gen line TARAN TARAN (2)FATEHABAD 3789. Completion nickname KHANJAR.
  - Completion (3)Phase 3 Secure BEAS Br. nicknames TALWAR.

#### ъ. 5 H

- (1)Grouping
  - (a) Under Comd
  - 'A' Coy 10 FF
  - In DS (P) Bty 15 (SP) Fd Regt (b)
  - (SP) Fd 15 (c) In Sp
  - (2) Task '
  - (a) Phase 1
- Cont as adv gd and secure Phase 2 (b) gen line FATEHABAD.

(P) Bty.

Orders later.

One Coy 10 FF (in phase

'Q' Bty 15 (SP) Fd Regt

15 (SP) Fd Regt less 'Q'

Regt

1ess

Be prep to assist in the cutting of the on L of C at BEAS Br. (c) Phase 3

3 only)

Bty.

Orders later.

#### 4 CAV c.

- (1)Grouping

(b)

(a)

- (a) Under Comd

In DS

- (c) In Sp
- (2) Tasks

Phase 1

(b)	Phase 2	Fol in order of march. Be prep to assist in the securing of phase 2 line.
(c)	Phase 3	Act as adv gd and secure BEAS Br.

Bty.

Orders later

securing

**FATEHABAD** 

As given above

all phases.

Later.

'R' Bty 15 (SP) Fd Regt

15 (SP) Fd Regt less 'R'

Be prep to assist 5 H in

Be prep to assist 4 CAV in securing BEAS Br.

Provide max aval sp

ST for phase 1 and H Hr

Incl to 4 Armd Bde line SIRHALI KALAN 2175 NAUSHA HRA 2080 - RANWAN 2282 -DHOTAN 2788 - VRING 3495 - DHOTA 3800 - RAYA KALAN.

for phase 2 later.

gen

line

in

#### d. 10 FF

- (1)Grouping
  - (a) In DS
  - (b) In Sp
  - (2) Tasks
  - (a)
  - Phase 1 (b) Phase 2
  - (c) Phase 3
- e. 15(SP) (1) Allotment
  - (2) Tasks
- f. Coord Instrs
  - (1) Timings

SP

- (2)
- (3) Bdrys
- Order of March
- (a) 5 H Gp

(4)

15 (SP) Fd Regt

- (c) 10 FF
- (d) Bde
- (e) 4 CAV
- (f) Adm Gp
- (5) Bounds

Place			Nickname
(a)	Iino	CIDUATI WAT AND	

- (a) Line SIRHALI KALAN TOM-CAT CHOHLA
- (b) Line DHOTAN JAMERA KING CROW 3283
- (c) Line DHOTAN 3603 BULL PUP KIRI SHAH 4494
- (6) Con pts, List Att.
- (7) Bde CL. NABIPUR KHARA Disty SOBRAON BRANCH.

# 4 AIM AND LOG

- a. <u>Gen</u>
  - (1) Normal main will cont.
  - (2) DAA will be in present loc at BHAI PHERU will move to NANGA on orders.
  - (3) SRP at OKARA.

### b. Rats

- (1) Normal maint.
- (2) 7 days res will be carried.

### C. Ammo

- (1) First line ammo in unit tpt.
- (2) Second line with 21 S & T Bn.

#### d. POL

- All veh tks full. (1)
- Jettison eqpt full. (2)
- 50 miles res in unit tpt. (3)
- Sec line lift with 21 S & T Bn. (4)
- to container issues on (5) container basis.

#### Tps e.

- (1) AI ech under unit con.
- A2 ech will be brigaded in present (2) loc and move as Bde ADM Gp in order of march.
- B ech, if any, will remain with (3) unit A2 echs.

#### Repair and Rec f. LADs auth to carry out fd repairs

**(1)** 

- within their scope. Lt Wksp Pl will move with Bde Adm Gp in order of march.
- All vehs will be recovered to the (3) Bde CL under unit arrangements.
- Fd Wksp Coy in DAA (4)

# Med

g.

- Normal chain of evac. (1)Evac.
- Will move with Bde Adm (2) ADS XDS One ` function and the other remain on vehs at all times.
  - In DAA. (3) XDS
  - Loc OKARA. (4) CCS

#### h. Pers

- (1) Reports and returns will be submitted as per Bde Standing Ordes for War.
- (2) PW Cage in DAA.
- (3) Pro To estb TP as ordered.

### 5. COMD AND SIG

- a. Bde Tac HQ To move behind adv gd.
- b. Main Bde In order of march.
- c. Sig Instrs Already issued.

#### ACK

DISTRIBUTION LIST - Att

Sd/ xxxxxxxx Maj for Comd (RAJA SAROOP KHAN)

352-

# DISTR LIST

		Copy Nos
1	5 H	1
2	4 CAV	2
3	10 FF	3
4	15 SP Fd Regt	4
5	48 Fd Amb	5
6	Lt Wksp Pl 72 EME Bn	6
7	Det Pro	7
8	Arty I Armd Div	8
9	3 Armd Bde	9
10	5 Armd Bde	10
11	12 CAV	11
12	HQ I Armd Div	12
13	Comd	13
14	ВМ	14
15	GSO 3 (0)	15
16	DAA & QMG	16
17	SC (AQ)	17
18	4 Armd Bde Sig Coy	18
19	File	19
20	War Diary	20 - 21
21	Spare	22 - 23

• • • • • •

Ser No	Date and time	Freq	Extract Remarks
1	101430	-	Immam Baz speaking here. Come and see me immediately.
			Where do I come to. I do not know.
			Move straight on and turn right.
	•		Do you know where I am. If I turn left, the Indians get me, if I turn right their arty gets me. Where do I come to and how.
			Turn right till you hit the road. Follow it and and you will find me at 38.
2	101600	-	Hellow 31 for IOB. Tell Immam 6 that Immam Baz is proud of what he has achieved today and would like to tell him that this was his finest hour for PAKISTAN. He must hold on to this strong hold of Indians under all circumstances. Reinforcement, however, have been requested for, for which Immam 6 should come back on the main road and do the needful.
3	101800	-	29A for Immam Baz. It is not possible to adv any further due to stiff resistance. Hy enemy shelling has completely pinned us down.
			1B for 29A. It is most important that the advance is continued. Therefore, in the name of the Islam, PAK and Nishane Jurat I command you to get up and go fwd.
			29A for IB. I will try my best. As things are I do not knew how the hell I am going to do that. This bloody enemy arty is knocking hell out of us and I am afraid at the moment I cannot do any thing better than this.

#### APPENDIX - IV

Copy No.19 No. 0011/3/GS(OPS) 6 Sep 65

#### I CORPS 00 No 1/65

(No change from verbal orders)

References: - (a) Map Sheets One in to 4 miles -

39H,39L,39P,40C,40D,40E,40F, 40G,40H,43E,43F,43G,43H,43J, 43K,43L,43M,43N,43O,43P,44C, 44D,44E,44F,44G,44H,44I,44J, 44K,44L,44M,44N,44O,44P,45E, 45F,45I,45L,45P,54A.

- (b) Map Sheets One in to 1 mile -
  - 43 L6 to L 16, 43 Pl to P 16, 44 I6, 44 I9, 44 I 10, 44 I 13, 44 I 14, 44 MI, 44 M2, 44 M5, 44 M6, 44 M9, 44 M 10
- (c) Trace 'T'
- (d) I Corps Operation Instruction No.1.

#### INFORMATION

#### Enemy

- Overall disposition, likely intentions and action by the PAKISTAN Army have been given in 1 Corps Operation Instruction No.1.
- 2. Against the JAMMU Sector the enemy is likely to have -
  - (a) 15 Inf Div deployed as follows:
    - i. One Inf bde defending SIALKOT.
  - ii. One Inf bde deployed on the International Border between SUCHETGARH - the BASANTAR R.
  - iii. One Inf bde deployed on the International Border between the BASANTAR R - SHAKARGARH.
    - (b) 6 Armd Div in depth in area PASRUR.

3. The enemy may attempt to occupy some of own police posts on D minus 1 or D Day prior to launching of own attack.

#### OWN TROOPS

- 4. XI Corps is attacking across the International Border on D minus 1 and is securing the line of the ICHHOGIL Canal from Pt 701221 to 798439.
- 5. Orbat 1 Corps is given in Appendix A attached.

#### INTENTION

6. I Corps will secure area Pt 896 (8128), Pt 857 (8227), PAGOWAL (8413), PHILLORA (9007), CHAWINDA (8902) and Cross Roads (9703) with a view to advancing towards the MARALA-RAVI Link Canal and eventually to the line of DHALLEWALLI (6438) WUHILAM (5010) - ĎASKA (5399) - MANDHALI (7845).

#### **METHOD**

### Gen outline

The Corps task will be carried out in three phases.

#### PHASE 1

(0317).

8 Securing bridge head bounded by Pt 896 (8128), Pt 857 (8227), BAJRAGARHI (8618), MAHARAJKE (9417), CHARWA (0320) and exploiting to line GULBAHAR WADI (7527) - SAIDANWALLI (7618) - AHMADPUR (9415) - NAINI

## Grouping

RIGHT 26 Inf Div with under command -

**18 CAV** 

One bty 44 Lt Regt on arrival

1 Bn PAP

Bn RAC

2 Tcls

in support -

24 Med Regt

6 Mtn Arty Bde (within range) 2 TAC

10 LEFT 6 Mtn Div less one bde with -

under command -

35 Inf Bde

Two sgns 62 CAV

166 Fd Regt

3 tcls

in support -

1 Arty Bde

24 Med Regt

2 TAC

11 Reserve - 1 Armd Div.

#### Special instructions

- 12. Prior to D Day there will be no patrolling across the Border. Patrolling will be restricted to 500 yards own side of the Border; Patrols will occupy the area of the Police Posts if the police prematurely withdraw. The three divisions will be responsible for their own sectors.
- 13. There will be no retaliatory artillery fire. DFs will be used only in the event of being heavily attacked by enemy ground forces.
- 14. Before H hour, LAA will not engage enemy aircraft operating singly or in pairs which are not causing damage to own AFVs and guns.
- 15. On D Day the Border Police posts will be relieved by own troops immediately after last 1t on D Day.
- 16. 62 CAV less two sqns will be under command 1 Armd Div for the protection of their LEFT flank in Phase 2.

#### PHASE 2

17. Break out by 1 Armd Div and capture PHILLORA.

#### GROUPING

18 1 Armd Div with under command - 62 CAV less one sqn

4 tcls

#### in support

6 Mtn Arty Bde

26 Arty Bde

24 Med Regt

on priority call

2 TAC

19 Reserve - 14 Inf Div.

Special instructions

20 1 Armd Div will break out through 6 Mtn Div at first light.

21 As opportunity develops, 1 Armd Div will exploit towards the RAVI-MARALA Link Canal.

## PHASE 3

Capture ZAFARWAL and secure area Cross Roads (9703) - CHAWINDA.

# Grouping

23 14 Inf Div with -

3 tcls

in support -

1 Arty Bde

6 Mtn Arty Bde

24 Med Regt

24 Reserve - 6 Mtn Div.

Boundaries, Junction Points, limit of exploitation

25. See Trace T attached.

Bomb lines

25. BLUE

(Sic) SIALKOT-BADIANA (7905) - PASRUR

```
26. GREEN
```

Line of the MARALA-RAVI Link Canal.

Artillery

- 27. See 1 Corps Arty Bde Operation Order No.1

  <u>Engineers</u>
- 28. See 1 Corps Engineer Technical Instruction No.1.

  Air
- 29. 2 TAC will be in support of 1 Corps.
- 30. Allotment of ACT and tcls:-
  - (a) 1 Armd Div 4
    - 6 Mtn Div 3 (already with the Div)
    - 14 Inf Div 3
    - 26 Inf Div 2 (already with the Div)

#### 31. Bomb line

BLUE - SIALKOT-BADIAN-PASRUR-NAROWAL thereafter on orders this HQ. of MARALA-RAVI.

GREEN - Line of MARALA-RAVI Link Canal.

D Day

32. 7 Sep 65.

H hr

2300 hrs.

#### **ADMINISTRATION**

### Defence Bricks Type I

34. Allotment -

1 Armd Div - 2

6 Mtn Div - 3

14 Inf Div - 3

26 Inf Div - 3

# Supplies and Petrol, Oil and Lubricants.

- 35. Three days reserve of supplies will be carried by all units.
- 36. CMA present loc SOUTH OF PATHANKOT.
- 37. Separate Administrative Orders are being issued.

#### INTERCOMMUNICATION

- 38. Main HQ I Corps KALU CHAK.

  Rear HQ I Corps Mile 59 Rd JULLUNDUR-PATHANKOT
- 39. <u>Signals</u>
  See I Corps Signal Instruction No 2/65
- 40. Code Names
  - (a) Own territory at Appendix 'B'
  - (b) Enemy territory at Appendix 'C'

#### ACKNOWLEDGE

Time of Signature 1845 hrs

Delivery Instructions -

Sd/- Brig BGS

Copy Nos 1-4 LO

5-8 OP IMMEDIATE

9-15 By hand

#### APPENDIX - V

### IAF ORBAT: 1 September 1965

The exact number of aircraft at the commencement of hostilities in the squadrons are not available. However, based on unit establishment of squadrons, the ORBAT of the IAF on 01 September 1965 consisted of the following:-

- 1. a) 5 Mystere Sqns i.e. 1,3,8,31 and 32 Sqn (all in the Western Sector).
  - b) 6 Hunter Sqns i.e. Nos 7,14,17,20,27 and 37 Sqn (No. 7,20,27 Sqns in the West and Nos. 14, 17 and 37 Sqn in the East).
  - c) 5 Gnat Sqns i.e. Nos. 2,9,18,23 and 15 Sqn (Nos 2,9,18 and 23 Sqn in the West).
  - d) 3 Toofani (Ouragon) Sqns i.e. NO. 4,29 and 47 Sqns (All in the East).
  - e) 6 Vampire Sqns i.e. Nos 24,45,101,108,220 and 221 Sqns (No.45 Sqn in the West)
  - f)  $4\frac{1}{2}$  Canberra Sqns i.e. No.5,16,35 JBCU and 106 Sqn in the West.
- 2. The Unit Establishment of Mystere, Hunter and Gnat Sqns was 16 ac each. The Toofani Sqns also had a UE of 16 ac each, the Vampire Sqns (Nos 24,45,220 and 221) had 16 ac UE, while 101 and 108 were specialist FR Sqns with UE of 8 Trainer ac modified for FR role. The 4 Canberra Sqns i.e. Nos 5,35,16 & JBCU had 16 ac UE each, while 106 SR Sqn had 8 ac modified for SR role on the UE.
- 3. Thus, the ORBAT of combat aircraft of the IAF would be as follows (if all these Sqns had full complement of aircraft):
  - a) Mysteres  $5 \text{ Sqns } \times 16 = 80 \text{ aircraft}$
  - b) Hunters 6 Sqns x 16 = 96  $^{"}$
  - c) Gnat 5 Sqns x 16 = 80 "
  - d) Toofani 3 Sqns x 16 = 48 "
  - e) Vampire i 4 Sqns x 16 = 64 " ii 2 Sqns x 8 = 16 "

- f) Canberra i 4 Sqns x 16 = 64 "
  ii ½ Sqn x 16 = 8 "
  g) MiGs 1 Sqn x 10 = 10 "

  466 "
- 4. It has been confirmed from JD Stats Air HQ that the figure of 572 combat ac was the total assets of the IAF including those aircraft held in storage as War wastage reserve in depots and HAL for major servicings etc. Therefore, the figure of 466 aircraft as ORBAT facing both West and East PAK would be a closer figure though this could be less by 5-6 ac. Thus, a figure of 460 combat aircraft would be a realistic figure.

Sd/-(C.S. Doraiswami) Air Cmde AF Member ISST 28 Sep 89

#### APPENDIX - VI

### AIR RAIDS ON AIRFIELDS

# ENEMY AIR RAIDS ON INDIAN AIRFIELDS AND S.Us.

	Units Raided No. of raids in brackets	No.	s Raided of Raids rackets
1.	Adampur (15)	8.	Jamnagar (11)
2.	Ambala (3)	9.	Jammu (3)
3.	Amritsar (9)	10.	Jodhpur (21)
4.	Agartala (1)	11.	Kalaikunda (2)
5.	Bagdogra (1)	12.	Pathankot (8)
6.	Barrackpore (1)	13.	Patiala (1)
7.	Halwara (17)	14.	Srinagar (5)
	• • • • •	( <u>Tot</u>	al Raids = 98)

# RAIDS ON ENEMY AIRFIELDS & S.Us.

	ields attacked	Airfields attacked	
NO.	of raids in brackets	No. of raids in brack	<u>kets</u>
1.	Akwal (3)	12. Kohat (1)	
2.	Bhagtanwala (1)	13. Lal Munirhat (1	L)
3.	Badin (1)	14. Mianwali (2)	
4.	Chaklala (1)	15. Multan (1)	
5.	Chak Jhumra (9)	16. Murid (1)	
6	Chanderi (1)	17. Nawabshah (2)	
7.	Chittagong (1)	18. Pasrur (1)	
8.	Chota Sargodha (2)	19. Peshawar (2)	
9.	Dab (1)	20. Risalwala (3)	
10.	Gujrat (2)	21. Sargodha (17)	
11.	Jessore (2)	22. Wagowal (6)	
		$(\underline{\text{Total Raids}} = 61)$	

Source: From Official Records.

### APPENDIX - VII

# TASHKENT DECLARATION\*

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.

Ι

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interest of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

#### II

The Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966, to the position they held prior to 5 August 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease fire line.

#### III

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

<sup>\*</sup> Tashkent Declaration (Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi)

IV

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

V

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic intercourse.

#### VI

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.

#### VII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

#### VIII

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussions of questions relating to the problems of refugees and evictions/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.

IX

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agreed that the sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on the matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.

They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to witness this declaration.

Prime Minister of India

President of Pakistan

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI

MOHAMMED AYUB KHAN

Tashkent, January 10, 1966

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#### APPENDIX - VIII

#### AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

# THE TEXT OF INDO-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

#### Introduction

This agreement is in four parts:

Part I - Procedure concerning the immediate disengagement of troops and reduction of tension;

Part II - Procedure concerning the withdrawal of troops from the occupied areas;

Part III - Procedure concerning reduction of tension in the Eastern Sector;

Part IV - General Points.

#### PART I

Disengagement of Troops and Reduction of Tension

#### PHASE I

Both forces will withdraw 1,000 yards from the line of actual control in sectors as specified below:-

- (a) Rajasthan/Sind
- (b) Amritsar/Lahore
- (c) Jammu/Sialkot
- (d) Akhnur/Chhamb (from River Chenab NW 8061 to Mawa Walikhad NW 7770)

In all other sectors including sectors divided by the 1949 Cease-Fire Line, troops will continue to hold their respective picquets as by so doing they will be automatically separated from each other. The only exception to this will be where, in hilly terrain, opposing forces are at present considered to be too close to each other, each side will withdraw to a distance to be mutually agreed upon by the local commanders not below the rank of Brigadier.

Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India), Foreign Affairs Record (External Publicity Division, New Delhi), XII (January 1966) pp.4-7.

(Note - In the Amritsar-Lahore sector, this 1000 yards withdrawal will be modified so that Pakistani troops who are actually on the West bank of the BRB Canal and Indian troops who are on the east bank of the BRB Canal facing each other will withdraw all armed personnel off the embankment to a distance of 200 yards on each side. Unarmed personnel may, however, live, move and work in this area.

The same principle will apply in Sulaimanki-Fazilka Sector, Hussainiwala Sector and Khem Karan Sector.)

After the withdrawal in this phase no new defences of any kind will be prepared in occupied territory.

There will be no movement of armed military, para-military or police personnel either armed or unarmed within the demilitarised zone and no civilian personnel will be permitted within it by either side.

The period for completion of this phase will be five days.

#### PHASE II

In this phase both sides will remove and nullify all defences which will include the:

- (a) lifting of mines; and
- (b) dismantling of all other defence works, less permanent defence structures constructed of steel and cement.

The period for completing this phase will be twenty-one days which will commence immediately after the five-day period mentioned in para 5.

Working parties for this purpose will be formed by unarmed military personnel in uniform. No civilian or civil labour will be used for these tasks.

While every effort will be made to dismantle all defence works within the specified period, where owing to weather and other conditions it is not possible to complete this, the uncleared area so left will be clearly marked and a sketch of these given to the other side.

There will be no firing of weapons or use of explosives within 10,000 metres of the line of actual control. Where explosives have to be used to dismantle defence works, this will only be done under supervision as specified later and after due intimation to the other side.

The present agreement affecting restriction on flights of aircraft will continue to apply.

To ensure that the action agreed to in Part I above is being implemented in letter and in spirit, the good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM will be utilised. In the event of a disagreement, their decision will be final and binding on both sides.

#### PART II

Withdrawal of Troops from Occupied Areas

After the dismantling of defences has taken place, all troops, para-military forces and armed police who are now on the other side of the international border and Cease-Fire Line, will be withdrawn. This withdrawal will be completed by 25 February 1966. If in any particular sector or part of a sector, the dismantling of defences has been completed earlier than the last date specified, withdrawal may be sector wise if mutually agreed to.

During this withdrawal, there will be no follow up by civilians, armed military, para-military or police personnel until 25 February 1966. Only unarmed military personnel at a strength mutually agreed upon at the sector level may move into these unoccupied areas for normal police duties (see paragraph 16 below).

After troops of both sides have crossed into their own territory the procedure which was being followed by Pakistan and India before 5 August 1965, for the security of the international border and Cease Fire Line, will apply. Attention is drawn to Ground Rules 1961 for West Pakistan/Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat (India).

It is essential that under all circumstances troops must move out of occupied areas by 25 February 1966, even if the dismantling of defence and lifting of mines have not been completed.

For immediate settlement of any points of dispute that may arise, sector commanders not below the rank of Major General will be designated by name and appointment both by India and Pakistan who will

meet to settle the differences. Telephone or R/T communication will be established between these designated sector commanders and will be permanently manned.

Any matter on which there is disagreement will be referred to the C-in-C, Pakistan Army, and COAS, India, for their joint decision. If the issue, is still not resolved by them the good offices of Major General T. Morambio will be utilised and his decision will be final and binding on both sides.

# PART III

Reduction of Tension in the Eastern Sector

The limit of withdrawal in the Eastern Sector will be left to local commanders not below the rank of Major General to mutually decide where necessary, in consultation with the civil authorities concerned. Both sides will arrive at a working agreement as soon as possible.

Border forces consisting of armed para-military police or any other irregular forces of both sides, will not open fire across the border under any circumstances.

Any encroachments across the border will be dealt with through apprehension of personnel concerned and thereafter handing them over to civil authorities.

In any case where firing takes place across the border it will be investigated on the spot by a joint team consisting of border personnel from both sides within 24 hrs of occurrence. Brigade Commanders/DIsG responsible for this investigation will be designated by name and appointment sectorwise for West Bengal, Assam and Tripura by India and for the adjoining areas of East Pakistan by Pakistan.

Liaison between commanders and telephone communications at various level will be established as given in paras 12 and 13 of the Ground Rules for Indo-East Pakistan border

To ensure that the above agreement is fully implemented, quarters meetings take place between Army and loce authorities of India and Pakistan, alternate in India and Pakistan, to assess the extent to what the agreement is working in practice.

These are a supplement to the Ground Rules formulated by the Military Sub-Committee of the Indian and Pakistani delegations on 20 October 1959.

General Points

The order to resolve any problems that may arise in the implementation of this agreement and to further maintain friendly relations between the two countries the C-in-C Pakistan and the COAS India will meet from the C-in-C Pakistan and the COAS India will meet from time to time. The meetings will be held alternately in India and Pakistan and will be initiated by the respective Government concerned.

Ground rules to implement this withdrawal agreement in Western Sector will be formulated by Lt General Bakhtiar Rana Pakistan, and Lt General Harbaksh Singh - India, under the Chairmanship of Major General T. Morambio as early as possible.

This agreement comes into effect as from 0600 hours IST/0630 hrs WPT 25 January 1966. Sautas et March en actuals . O estance ...

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# ROLE OF PARA-MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIANS

#### PARA-MILITARY ORGANISATIONS

Some para-military forces e.g. Border Security Force, the Punjab Armed Police (PAP), the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) were deployed on active duty and took part in the operations during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. Officers and men of these para-military units did a great job in the wake of Pakistani aggression on Indian soil. Some men of these forces performed deeds of valour and contributed their best to the cause of the war.

These para-military forces posted on the borders were placed under the operational command of the army, and they gave close support to the armed forces. At many places they fought shoulder to shoulder with the Army. Brief details of the assignments carried out by various battalions of these forces are given below:-

#### (a) PAP & BSF

#### 33 PAP Bn embodied as 26 Bn BSF

This battalion which was located at Amritsar during 1965 participated in the war along with some army units i.e. 3 Jat, 4 Sikh and the Kumaon Regiment. The unit personnel performed mainly the roles of guides/scouts.

# 25 Bn BSF

The battalion was located at Ferozpur and was designated as 29 PAP Bn. The jurisdiction of this battalion was from Ferozpur to Fazilka. This battalion had to face the first onslaught of the Pakistan Army in September 1965 in area Hussainiwala, and gave a good account of itself. Four of its jawans laid down their lives for the country. The good work done by the men of this battalion had been recognised by awarding seven gallantry awards to them, including one posthumously.

# 30 Bn BSF

In 1965, 30 Bn BSF was deployed in area Kargil under the Army and allotted role for guard duties. On 10 August 1965, while guarding the

bridge Shamsa on Dras-Kargil highway two unit personnel were killed due to firing by Pak forces.

#### 20 Bn BSF

During the 1965 conflict with Pakistan, this battalion of the Punjab Armed Police did extremely well and captured approximately 50 sq km of Pak area across river Ravi before the cease-fire was declared. However, disregarding the cease-fire, the enemy counter-attacked to re-occupy their captured post Kot Doaba. The men of this battalion stood their ground against heavy attack of the enemy, and repulsed it.

#### 48 Bn BSF

During this war, the men of this battalion were deployed on active duty in R.S.Pura (Jammu Range) as well as on the vital installations there. They acquitted themselves extremely well and earned high appreciation of higher formations. Two officials of the battalion got President's Medal for acts of gallantry.

#### 21 Bn BSF

This battalion was deployed in the posts on both sides of the river Ravi in the Dera Baba Nanak sector during the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict. The battalion fighting along with the Army occupied two Pakistani posts and took in possession important enemy documents, besides inflicting considerable casualties on the enemy. They also captured the Ravi bridge. When the Pakistanis counter-attacked the bridge, the para-military forces along with the Indian troops faced the attack bravely and compelled the Pak troops to retreat. The Pakistanis were left with no alternative but to damage the bridge, while retreating.

A few more PAP battalions i.e. 11 Bn BSF, 23 Bn BSF and 24 Bn BSF also participated in the conflict in association with the army units.

The PAP was also primarily responsible for rounding up the bulk of para-troopers dropped by Pakistan in Punjab for sabotaging vital installations. Though the saboteurs were armed with the most sophisticated automatic weapons, they met the challenge successfully. In addition, they maintained the supply lines to the front without the least delay, and guarded a number of bridges on strategic

roads, railway lines and airports. They were mainly responsible for the high morale of the border population.

The Prime Minister in a broadcast to the nation, on 23 September 1965, said: "I would also like to refer to the men of the armed police force who have had to meet the challenge of Pakistani infiltrators and paratroopers. At many places they had to stand shoulder to shoulder with our Armed forces to fight the invaders. In this task many of them laid down their lives. But they have succeeded in adding a glorious chapter to the history of Indian police"(1).

#### (b) CRPF

#### 3rd Battalion

The battalion gallantly resisted and repelled the attack of 50 to 60 Pak raiders on the Wayil Bridge on the Srinagar-Leh Road and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy in dead and wounded. The battle lasted from 0330 hours to 0500 hours on 18 August 1965. In the encounter, the battalion captured two Bren guns, one sten gun and some explosives and ammunition from the enemy, and won four medals for gallantry.

# 6th Battalion

D Coy of the battalion was deployed under 121 Inf Bde during OP Riddle. One of its platoons along with two platoons of 7 Sikh were sent to defend the Gali post against a Pakistani attack. The combined force (Army and CRPF), despite being surrounded by Pak army from all sides, and its road and air links having been cut off, defended the post displaying brave resistance and determination. Consequently, the Pak Army could not capture the Gali post for seven days. The unit won two gallantry medals for this action.

### 13th Battalion

The battalion was deployed in Yusmarg area in the Kashmir Valley in August 1965 to protect Government property and important installations against acts of sabotage by Pak guerillas. The

battalion displayed extra-ordinary vigilance and determination in defending the Yusmarg bridge against a Pakistani attack in August 1965. The attack was repulsed, and the raiders, while retreating, left-behind many casualties. The battalion casualty was one dead and a few injured, and four men of the battalion were awarded gallantry medals.

#### 14th Battalion

During the 1965 Indo-Pak war the battalion gave good account of itself by capturing many Pakistani infiltrators, who were handed over to the army. The battalion also did the convoy duty from Srinagar to Ladakh.

#### 16th Battalion

The battalion moved to Jalandhar for law and order duties in the first week of September 1965. After a brief spell of duty in Punjab, three of its companies were moved to Jammu and Kashmir and placed under the operational control of the army.

#### 2nd Battalion

The 2nd Bn CRPF which was deployed in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 stoutly defended their posts against Pak aggression in the area and earned a place of pride for CRPF in the annals of the country's war history.

A few more CRPF battalions were associated with the Army during the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict. The 20th Bn was first placed under 10 Inf Div, and it later came under 26 Inf Div, while the 22nd Bn was deployed in Punch/Rajouri sector under the operational control of the army.

Most of these CRPF battalions were assigned mainly the task of dealing with Pak raides and for guarding military installations and vulnerable points. The battalions acquitted themselves creditably.

# (c) Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC)

# 2nd Bn RAC embodied as 11th Bn BSF

In 1965 this battalion was stationed at Shri Ganga Nagar on the western boundary of Rajasthan. Six companies of this battalion were posted at various border posts as noted below:-

- i) A Coy at border post Naggi.
- ii) B Coy at border post Sweeper Head.
- iii) A Coy at border post Hindumal Kot, Naya Camp.
  - iv) D Coy at border post Hindumal Kot, Purana Camp Gurudwara.
    - v) E Coy at border post Q Head, Madira.
  - vi) F Coy at border post S.P.

Some of the border posts, held by these companies during the 1965 war, i.e. Hindumal Kot, Renuka, Madira and Naggi, etc., were attacked by the Pak forces, but the companies held on to these positions bravely and gave a befitting reply to the enemy. All the attacks of the enemy were repulsed, and the Pakistanis had to suffer heavy losses in men and material in these encounters.

#### 5th and 6th Bn RAC

These battalions were placed under the operational control of the army and were allotted defensive roles. The 6th Bn RAC was deployed along the border, with HQ at Barmer.

#### 7th Bn RAC

During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, this battalion remained under the operational command of 11 Inf Div and took part in various operations under 11 Inf Div and Bdes connected with it Two companies of the battalion fought along with the army in occupying Gadra city. Two platoons of the battalion, which were stationed at Munabao, continued to fight the enemy at this post for 20 hours, but had to fall back later in the face of heavy Pak shelling. One company of this battalion was posted at Panchla post. When the Pakistanis attacked the post and occupied it on 13 September 1965, the company had put up a good fight, but failed due to enemy superiority in strength. Ten of its personnel were killed and 34 captured by the Pakistani Army. One platoon of this battalion advanced along with the army from Khadin base in Sakardu. These troops were, however, forced to withdraw in the face of an assault by Pak troops supported by heavy guns on 16 September 1965. But the Indian troops supported by RAC personnel re-occupied

the posts of Khadin and Sakarbu on 17 September 1965 with the help of reinforcements. The unit took part in operations after the cease-fire also. For displaying exemplary courage, devotion to duty and distinguished leadership, four officers of this unit were decorated with gallantry awards.

#### THE CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTION

The civilians played a magnificent role in the September conflict. The emotional backing provided by the country as a whole, and Punjab in particular, was most inspiring. Everyone was anxious to contribute his or her mite in whatever form possible. The demands of the time created an inner rejuvenation which completely changed the tone and tenor of the society.

The people of Punjab took the news of Pakistani aggression with a dignified calm. The war hysteria, the panic and the jitters normally associated with front-line states was conspicuously absent. There was a pleasing air of confidence about them. Men, women and children stuck to their posts. They displayed martial valour and patriotic fervour of the highest order. The morale of the people was exceptionally high. And as the days rolled by and the war assumed greater intensity, it only served to fortify their resolution to stick it out, come what may.

In the rest of India, the ennui, the inertia and listlessness vanished; political wranglings and social distinctions disappeared - in fact all differences were sunk in the one common resolve to crush the invader. Gift parcels of utility articles and numerous other contributions flowed in from all over the country. The defence fund swelled to an unexpected figure within the first week and continued to maintain its upward spiral throughout the period of the conflict and even thereafter. People from all walks of life came forward to contribute what they were capable of giving.

There were long queues of blood donors, patiently awaiting to make their contribution at the various blood banks. Scores of civilian doctors volunteered their services and some of them worked round the clock losing all sense of time and fatigue until they collapsed through sheer exhaustion. The women of India too played a glorious part. Volunteer organisations sprang up like mushrooms overnight to serve the cause in a variety of ways - knitting of woollens, collection of funds, service in hastily organised canteens on railway stations, and so on.

Nurses and telephone operators stood gallantly by their posts, defying all danger.

To cite an example of this voluntary social service, the invaluable work done by a lady Member of the Legislative Assembly of Punjab, Mrs. Sarla Sharma, may be mentioned. She had entered India's freedom struggle at the age of 18, and was jailed by the British at the age of 20. At the out-break of the war, leaving behind her two young daughters, aged 18 and 12 years, at Chandigarh, Mrs. Sharma went to Pathankot alone to serve the wounded officers and men at the Army Hospital there. It is claimed that she organised a team of 40 students and three teachers of the S.D. College, Pathankot, and rendered medical and other necessary aid to the wounded army personnel daily from 9 A.M. to 6 P.M. Later, some women of Pathankot also joined her. When the wounded jawans arrived, the volunteers used to quickly transfer them on stretchers to Hospital Wards.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Dr. Sushila Nayyar visited the Army Hospital, Pathankot, and greatly appreciated the noble work done by Mrs. Sharma and her team(1).

In the Press and over the Radio, there flowed a continuous stream of inspiring news items extolling the deeds of the officers and men in the front-line.

And the civil service, especially in Punjab, rose to the occasion with commendable zeal to assist the Army in every conceivable way. On the very first day of the conflict, as many as 600 vehicles were commandeered for Army use. This fleet swelled to a fantastic figure of 4000 vehicles within the next five days. The civil vehicle fleet continued to ply in the service of the Army throughout the period of the conflict, with their drivers sharing the hazards of the fighting soldier. It was a symbol of the highest courage and patriotism. Normally their duty should have been to keep open the lines of communication in the rear. However, they shared with armed forces all the hazards and dangers of the battle zone. Their convoys moved swiftly forward, carrying vital army supplies, even into the enemy territory. There was enormous demand for civil labour which was promptly met on most occasions, however short the notice. And above all, there was a firm grip on the civil front which enabled the Army to concentrate exclusively on its primary role of fighting the invader.

Mrs. Sarla Sharma's Letter No. HPSSIEC: PS -Chairman/89, dated Shimla, 2 November 1989.

The local police also played a prominent part during this period. They had to maintain law and order, keep the roads clear for military traffic, protect vital installations, watch the activities of Pakistani agents, patrol at night, and enforce curfew and black-out. The police performed all these duties creditably in the midst of heavy shelling and bombing by the enemy.

In dealing with enemy paratroopers, the civilians took a major part in overpowering these armed groups and handing them over to the military authorities. With the spread of enemy para operations in Punjab, a threat was anticipated to the railway and road communications. The Punjab Government was, therefore, requested to put into operation the Internal Security Scheme. The civil authorities responded immediately. All NCC cadets in the Punjab were mobilised and they did an excellent job of imposing black-outs and carrying out other civil defence duties. The boy cadets took up traffic control and the guarding of vulnerable areas and vulnerable points in all the major towns, while the girls manned telephone exchanges and worked in hospitals.

The village population rose to the occasion, and, apart from helping the army in the capture of the parachutists, patrolled the railway lines and manned a number of vital bridges.

Inhabitants of the border villages stuck to their posts, facing the dangers of cross-fire, bombing and strafing from enemy planes, and guided the Indian Army units through local paths and tracks. They helped the Army in their tasks through miscellaneous services and went out on recce trips on their own and brought information of enemy movements. They also kept round the clock vigil to prevent any possible mischief by enemy agents. In several Punjab villages people voluntarily came forward to cut down their standing crops in order to help eliminate the possible hideout for paratroopers. In all the villages in Punjab, night patrol squads were organised by the village Panchayats.

In the early days of fighting, when the Army was continuously on the move, the jawans did not have to do any cooking for themselves, as the villages from miles around brought to them chapatis, tea, milk, parched gram, cigarettes, sweets and other snacks and eats. There was no need for appeals to the people and

exhortations from leaders or the government. The villagers did it spontaneously. On their own initiative, they pooled their resources and organised production and distribution of various items in the forward areas(1).

Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, GOC-in-C, Western Command, who was directly responsible for the conduct of the War in the entire Western theatre, paid a glowing tribute to the civilian war efforts when he stated: "Much of the gallantry and self-sacrifice of the Indian jawan was due to their confidence that the whole country was behind him." The General added: "The enthusiasm of the civilian population of the area and the emotional backing which they gave to the advancing troops was to be seen to be believed."

The railways too did a grand job. The railway system was a vital link in the country's defence. The railway staff maintained the supply line with exemplary zeal, devotion and dedication. They kept the wheels moving at the risk of their lives. The Railway Special Emergency Force displayed remarkable gallantry on the border areas during the Pak aggression. Under severe bombardment and shelling by the enemy at various forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan, the force patrolled railway tracks, escorted trains and guarded vulnerable railway installations.

The Indian Red Cross Society also did not lag behind to serve in the national cause. Immediately on the outbreak of the conflict, the IRCS formulated its emergency services to provide relief to the civilian population affected by the conflict. A large civilian population, estimated over 260,000, residing in the border areas of Jammu, Amritsar, Firozpur, and Gurdaspur (Punjab), and Barmer (Rajasthan) were displaced(2). Most of them were accommodated in camps specially set up for them. The Indian Red Cross Society provided relief to them directly. Besides other relief measures, the Society sent large quantities of milk-powder, blankets, garments, quilts, medicines, etc., valued at over & 5.5 lakhs. It also sent blankets for distribution among Indian internees in Pakistan who were disembarked at Bombay.

Several thousand packets/parcels containing woollen garments and other articles of daily use were sent to Service hospitals in Base and forward areas

<sup>1.</sup> Mankekar, D.R., p. 149.

Indian Red Cross Society's Letter No.100/ADM/90 358/ dated 23 Feb., 1990

for the sick and wounded armed forces personnel, undergoing treatment there. Relief supplies were also sent for Border Security personnel. The officers of the Society visited the camps in the affected areas in Punjab and some of the Military hospitals, and presented gift packets to the sick and the needy personally.

#### Voluntary Hospital Service

The Chairman of the Red Cross Society instituted the "Indian Red Cross Voluntary Hospital Service", the volunteers of which visited the sick and wounded jawans in Service hospitals at regular intervals and assisted them in solving their problems. Nearly 100 volunteers enrolled themselves in Delhi and divided themselves in groups of 24 each. They rendered service in the hospital at Delhi Cantt.in one or two shifts on 6 days a week for about two months. During their visits, they also presented fruits, sweets etc., to the sick and wounded. Similar groups of lady volunteers visited hospitals frequently at Ambala, Amritsar, Jalandhar and Chandigarh. The lady volunteers also knitted and stitched garments for the jawans and also helped in the preparation of gift packets for the jawans and PsOW.

Over 2,000 persons were imparted training in First Aid and Home Nursing at 125 centres, set up in Delhi by the Indian Red Cross Society.

The Society also collected blood from over 1,800 donors and handed over 2,400 bottles of blood to the Director General of the Armed Forces Medical Services for the treatment of the sick and wounded of the Armed Forces(1).

The Society also set up an Information Bureau to handle enquiries from the next of kin of the PsOW, civilian internees, including crews of captured merchant ships and trains, in both India and Pakistan. Hundreds of messages/letters received from the next of kin of the PsOW and civilian internees in both countries were transmitted through the good offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, set up in India and Pakistan.

# Exchange of PsOW

The first batch of 549 Indian PsOW was received by the Indian Red Cross Society and the delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross at

<sup>1.</sup> Ibid.

Hussainiwala near Firozpur on 2 February 1966. Later, 543 more Indian PsOW were received in three batches on 8, 22 and 25 February 1966. The Indian trains' and ships' crew personnel numbering 398, held by Pakistan, were also repatriated along with the PsOW(1).

# POLITICAL SUPPORT

Internecine quarrels suddenly ended when Pakistan threatened India's freedom. Natioinal unity and discipline were immediately forged and maintained. The entire Indian nation, irrespective of caste, creed or religion, resented the treacherous attack and opposed it tooth and nail. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri enjoyed exceptional and universal esteem and affection, even of his political opponents. All the leaders of various political parties gave full support to the Government in resisting the Pakistani aggression. The opposition leaders who had consistently advocated conciliation, vociferously pleaded for retaliatory action against Pakistan. They demanded that India should answer the threat posed by Pakistani infiltrators by bombing the guerilla bases even at the risk of war between the two countries. Sarvodaya leader Jayaprakash Narayan, President of the Indo-Pakistan Conciliation Group, isued a statement on 19 August 1965, in which he said: "It is the plain duty of the Government of India under these conditions to eliminate this threat from Pakistan by all means at their command and I fully support the measures that have been taken to this end." Addressing a public meeting on 4 September 1965, he said, "the first thing to do at the present moment was to drive out all Pakistani infiltrators from Kashmir and to plug all the vulnerable points through which they were coming."

The Samyukta Socialist Party supported the Government action on 26 August 1965, in crossing of the cease-fire line in Kashmir by our armed forces. The same day, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, General Secretary of All India Jan Sangh, demanded that the Indian Army should be allowed a free hand in putting an end to Pakistani invasion. Both the Communist parties condemned the Pakistani aggression and assured the Government of their full support against foreign assured their full support to the Prime Minister in the task of safeguarding the nation's frontiers.

At a conference called by the Prime Minister on 6 September 1965, the leaders of DMK, Akali Dal and

<sup>1.</sup> Ibid.

the Muslim League, along with the leaders of other parties, promised all support to the Government in the struggle with Pakistan. The DMK leader, C.N.Annadurai, declared that there should be a moratorium on all controversies and said, "No party would betray the valour and heroism of our soldiers."

During the Pakistani invasion it was proved that the Indian secularism was deep-rooted and strong. All the minority communities - the Muslims, the Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and Buddhists - condemned the Pakistani aggression. The Muslim League President, Mohammed Ismail, said that the "People will make all sacrifices in fighting the enemy." Many other Muslim leaders, organisations and institutions in India expressed concern at the serious situation created by the Pakistani aggression. On 8 September 1965, thirty-six Muslim members of Parliament belonging to all parties condemned Pakistan's "naked aggression on India."

The Sikh leaders all over the country sharply reacted to the mischievous propaganda broadcast from POK Radio station which tried to incite the Sikhs. The POK Radio made frequent appeals from the 'Revolutionary Council' to Sant Fateh Singh in particular and the Sikhs in general to start a 'similar fight' to gain a separate state for themselves. Several Sikh members of Parliament on 8 September 1965 denounced Pakistan's "pernicious radio propaganda" and declared that "the Sikhs will fight to a man along with other sons of India" to repel aggression and protect the honour and integrity of their mother country. Sant Fateh Singh who was to go on fast on 10 September 1965, to be followed by self-immolation on 25 September 1965, to press the Government to concede the demand of Punjabi Suba, announced on 9 September 1965, that he would not start his proposed fast because of national emergency. By putting the country above his vow, the Sant doomed the Pakistani ambition to sow seeds of hatred between the Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab. Prominent Sikh leaders of Punjab described Pakistan's attempt to exploit the patriotic sentiments of the Sikhs as nothing but "crude self-deception on its part.

Thirteen Christian members of Parliament in a joint statement on 6 September 1965, called upon all Christians in India to "make every sacrifice to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of our motherland." A similar statement was issued by Buddhist leaders calling upon the members of their community to extend their fullest support to the Government of India and to pledge their services for the defence of the motherland.

Numerous other organisations and bodies in the country offered their services in the national cause. Pakistan had invaded India in the hope that the edifice of Indian secularism would fall at the first stroke of violence. But she was disappointed to find the situation quite contrary to her expectations.